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Demography and Equity Premium1
Wolfgang Kuhle2
This article comprises a tractable two-generations-overlapping, stochastic, neoclas-
sical production economy, where government bonds are in positive net supply. In this
framework we show that the entrance of larger (smaller) cohorts into the labor market
will lead to an increase (decrease) in the risky and the riskless rate and to an increase
(decrease) in the expected equity premium.
1. Introduction
The question of how the entrance of smaller cohorts into the labor market will aect
the equity risk premium over the coming decades has recently attracted widespread
attention. However, little consensus has been reached so far. While Brooks (2002)
and Geanakoplos et al. (2004) project a decrease in the equity premium for the coming
decades, Brooks (2004) and B orsch-Supan et al. (2007) project an increase in the equity
premium for that period. Contrary to these previous studies, which were based purely on
computational models and yielded conicting evidence, the current article will present
a tractable, two-generations-overlapping neoclassical growth model in Section 2. This
model will be a modied version of the Diamond (1965) framework and is therefore
related to the recent contributions of Abel (2001) and Abel (2003).3 Our framework
will underline the link between the growth rate of population and the rate of return
to capital by means of a general concave production technology. On the side of the
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helpful discussion. Financial support by the U.S. Social Security Administration through grant #10  
P   98363   1   04 to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the State of Baden-W urttemberg
and the German Insurers Association (GDV) is gratefully acknowledged.
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3Abel (2001) focuses on a policy of exploiting the equity premium by means of a social security trust
fund diversication into equity in an economy where the risky rate of return is exogenously given and
population is stationary. Abel (2003) examines the implications of a high realization of a stochastic
birth rate with respect to the price of capital in an economy where utility, production and adjustment
costs are Cobb-Douglas.
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household we will emphasize the portfolio choice behavior by using an Epstein and
Zin (1989) utility function. A further characteristic feature of this model is that safe
(government) debt will not be in zero net supply. It will be issued by a government
rather than the households. Subsequently, Section 3 deals with the consequences of the
entrance of a small/large cohort into the labor market. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. Technology and factor prices
The economy is inhabited by overlapping generations who live for two periods; one
period of work is followed by one period of retirement. During the rst period of life,
each individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically and population evolves according
to:
Nt+1 = (1 + nt)Nt; (1)
where Nt is the size of the cohort born at time t and 1 + nt is the number of children
raised by each member of cohort t.
Production is characterized by a continuous, concave, constant returns to scale,
aggregate production function F(Kt;Nt). This production process is subject to an
aggregate technology shock zt, which follows a log-normal distribution. Furthermore we
assume that this shock is on average neutral. Per capita output yt is therefore given by:
yt = ztf(kt); f
0() > 0; f
00() < 0; E[zt] = 1; 8t: (2)
Once the respective realization of the shock zt is known, each rm will rent capital










= zt(f(kt)   f
0(kt)kt): (4)
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2.2. Government Debt
Contrary to the conventional approach, where safe debt/consumption loans are issued
by the households (zero net supply), we will take note of the fact that the government
is the only entity that can supply safe debt. The budget constraint of the government
is given by:
Bt + Ntt = rtBt 1; (5)
where Bt 1 is the amount of outstanding and Bt the amount of newly issued debt in
period t. Lump sum taxes are denoted by t. The rate of interest on government debt
which was issued at time t 1 is denoted by rt. This rate of interest earned on government
debt is deterministic, i.e. at time t the government issues debt with a guaranteed rate
of return rt+1. Risk avers individuals will therefore be willing to hold safe debt even if
its rate of return is below the expected risky rate. In our model we will assume that the
government pursues a Maastricht debt policy, as it is indeed practiced in most European
countries. Such a Maastricht policy is characterized by a constant debt output ratio :
Bt
Yt
=  8t: (6)







From now on we use (7) to determine per capita taxes .
2.3. Households
The representative household lives for two periods and supplies labor inelastically in the
rst period only. Towards the end of the rst period the household faces a consump-
tion/saving and a portfolio allocation decision. Preferences over current and future
consumption, ct;1 and ct+1;2, are described by a simplied Epstein and Zin (1989) utility
function:




1 ]; 0 < ; 0 <  < 1: (8)
The utility function in (8) exhibits an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of unity.
Hence, the individual savings/consumption decision is independent of the interest rate,
since income and substitution eects cancel and precautionary savings neither dampen
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nor amplify private thrift. This assumption is reasonable as long as the (ambiguous)
inuence of changes in the rate of interest on savings is not too large. This assumption is
also necessary to keep the general equilibrium analysis tractable. The crucial advantage
of this specication can be seen in the coecient of relative risk aversion  with respect
to second period consumption, which allows to study the entire scope of the portfolio
choice problem.
Recalling the taxes levied by the government (7), the value of wealth owned by the
consumer when young can be written as:4

t := wt   t: (9)
For given values of lifetime wealth 
, the individual chooses to hold assets amounting
to:
at := bt + ht; (10)
where bt and ht are the amounts of riskless bonds and risky capital respectively. Denoting
the portfolio share of risky assets by t = ht
at and the share of riskfree assets by (1 t) =
bt
at yields, according to (8) and (9), the following household problem:
max
a; Ut = ln(















where the propensity to save out of wealth is 
1+. The portfolio choice is characterized
by the familiar implicit condition for t:
Et





Using a second order Taylor series approximation, Campbell and Viceira (2002) show
that the corresponding optimal portfolio share can be approximated as:
t(Rt+1;rt+1;) =












4The individual receives his wage wt after the realization of zt is known. Note also that taxes are
known once zt is known.
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where 2
t = V ar[ln(Rt+1)] = V ar[ln(z)] and ln(Et[Rt+1]) = Et[ln(Rt+1)]+1
22
t.5 Once the






































where the expressions in (16) indicate that for positive expected equity premia the share
devoted to the risky asset reacts more sensitive with respect to the riskfree rate than
the risky rate. Therefore we nd that an increase in both rates of return, which leaves
the equity premium unchanged, will result in a lower portfolio share in the risky asset.
2.4. Equilibrium
Having completed the partial analysis of the rm, the government and the household,
we can now turn towards the equilibrium conditions for the bond and equity markets.
Capital market clearing requires:





The bond market equilibrium condition reads:





Taken together, equations (17), (18), (14) and (3) dene the time path of the capital
intensity k, the safe rate of return r, the optimal portfolio share  and the risky rate R.
Finally, the resulting expected equity premium Et[t+1] is given by:
Et[t+1] = Et[Rt+1]   rt+1 = f
0(kt+1)   rt+1: (19)
3. Baby-Boom and Equity-Premium
We can now consider the consequences of the entrance of a large/small cohort into the
labor market. Taking the current state of the economy (kt 1;kt;zt 1;zt) as given, we
5 The rate of return Rt+1 = zt+1f0(kt+1) inherits its log-normal distribution from the technology
shock zt+1. Thus, ln(Rt+1) follows a normal distribution.
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Interpretation of these expressions is straightforward: the expressions in equation (20)
indicate that a change in the growth rate of population does not change government
taxes (7). Hence the value of life-cycle income 
t out of which individuals save a
constant fraction remains unchanged. Thus an increase in the relative size of the next
cohort lowers the capital intensity and increases the expected future return on risky
investments. The expressions in (21) follow from the bond market equilibrium condition.
They indicate that, for
d(f0(kt+1))
dnt > 0 the government has to oer a higher riskless rate,
i.e.
drt+1
dnt > 0 to sell a given amount of debt. With respect to the expected equity
premium (19) we can now use the individual portfolio adjustment behavior described in



















Therefore we nd that due to the asymmetric portfolio adjustment behavior an increase
in the growth rate for population also increases the expected equity premium.
4. Conclusion
Motivated by the conicting results of previous computational studies, we have discussed
the causal link between the entrance of smaller cohorts into the labor market and the
equity premium in a simple two-generations-overlapping economy. At the expense of
closed-form solutions we have chosen a framework with a general neoclassical, concave,
production function and a fairly general (CRRA) portfolio adjustment behavior.
In this framework we have then shown that the entrance of a small cohort into the
labor market will lead to a lower expected equity premium. While both rates of return
fall, the risky rate will fall by more than the riskless rate.
The causal link between the age distribution and the equity premium is indirect.
It operates through the capital widening eect that increases the expected risky rate
6REFERENCES 4.
and forces the government to oer a higher riskless rate to sell its debt. The resulting
increase in the expected equity premium is then solely a consequence of the asymmetric
portfolio adjustment behavior, i.e. f0 < jrj.
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